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Abstract 
Scholars have increasingly turned to theories of organizational culture to understand 
and explain organizational crime.  Research supports the basic supposition of this approach 
– that the cultural milieu in complex organizations exerts a powerful influence on patterns of 
behavior.  However, culture-based theories suffer from two major shortcomings.  First, 
there remains considerable confusion as to exactly what constitutes a criminogenic 
organizational culture.  Second, no model has been offered to explain how criminogenic 
values spread throughout organizational hierarchies.  This paper draws on extant theory 
and research to fill these gaps and construct a more complete theoretical account of 
organizational culture and organizational crime.  The model articulated here posits that 
criminogenic organizational cultures can be identified by the presence of techniques of 
neutralization.  Furthermore, the multiplicity and generalizability of different neutralization 
techniques indicates the degree to which any given organizational culture is criminogenic.  
Several constituent components of social learning theory, principally differential association-
reinforcement and operant conditioning, are applied to detail how neutralizing techniques 
spread in a top-down fashion throughout entire organizations.  Policy implications for the 
prevention of organizational crime are offered. 
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Introduction 
The study of white collar crime has been wrought with conceptual skirmishes since 
its inception.  Indeed, “few, if any, legal or criminological terms are surrounded by as much 
dispute as white-collar crime” (Geis, 1992:31).  Many of these skirmishes result from the 
fact that white-collar crime, regardless of how it is defined, includes a wide variety of 
behaviors.  In some instances these skirmishes have severely impeded theory development 
and evaluation (Cressy, 2001).  However, they have also led to the creation of internally 
consistent subcategories of white-collar crime.  These subcategories, much like those 
employed in the study of traditional crime (e.g., violent crime, property crime, etc.), are 
distinguished according to the nature of the behavior that comprise them.   
One of the clearest distinctions that have been drawn between various forms of 
white collar crime distinguishes “offenses committed by individuals for themselves…” and 
“offenses committed by corporate officials for their corporation” (Clinard & Quinney, 
1973:188).  The latter – organizational crime – refers to illegal acts by employees of 
legitimate formal organizations to promote organizational goals and interests.  The defining 
characteristic of organizational crime is the ancillary importance of individual reward in favor 
of organizational benefit (Ermann & Lundman, 1978).  Organizational crimes, such as the 
Enron scandal, include some of the most devastating criminal acts throughout history. 
Studies have found that organizational cultures exert a powerful influence on 
organizational conduct, including crime (Benson, 1985; Braithwaite, 1989a; Braithwaite, 
1993; Calavita, Pontell, & Tillam, 1997; Coleman, 1992; Ott, 1989; Vaughn, 1996).  Despite 
these findings, scholars have yet to construct a general and coherent theoretical framework Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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from which an organizational culture approach could be developed and refined (Colemen, 
1992; Shover & Hochstetler, 2002).  To date, cultural theories of organizational crime 
derive from a variety of independent constructs and studies.   As Hochstetler and Copes 
(2001:219) aptly stated, “whereas all apparently agree that organizational culture is shared, 
precisely what is shared is less clear.”  Ott’s (1989) meta-analysis revealed that 
approximately 73 different constructs have been used to define the term organizational 
culture.  Therefore, the first goal of this essay is to construct a definition of criminogenic 
organizational culture that can be operationalized. 
Organizational culture is essentially an ethical tone that can be used to characterize 
the criminogenic tendencies of organizations (Frerichs, 1996).  Locating the origins of these 
cultures is an imperative theoretical question.  Research has demonstrated time and again 
that the substance and tone of any organization’s culture is determined by those at the top 
of the hierarchy (Jenkins & Braitwaithe, 2001).  However, research has yet to demonstrate 
exactly how these cultural values are transmitted.  The second goal of this essay is to 
identify the mechanisms through which criminogenic values spread across organizations.  
The theory presented here not only fills a gap in the literature, but also offers policy 
implications for the prevention of organizational crime.  If criminogenic organizational 
culture and its methods of transmission can be identified, then they can be interrupted or 
manipulated. 
Organizational Culture 
The Cultural Approach 
  Scholars have traditionally applied structural and individual-level theories to the 
study of organizational crime.  Organizational culture theory attempts to account for 
organizational crime according to group associations.  This is not to say, however, that such 
an approach is a total devaluation of structural or individual effects.  In some markets, for 
example, violations of both criminal and administrative law violations are endemic, while in 
others it is relatively rare (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Shover & Bryant, 1993).   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
2011, Vol. 3 (1):89-109    Trahan 
 
92 
 
Structural theories of organizational crime typically involve explanations related to 
the performance of industries and variations in opportunity. These theories often resemble 
general strain theories in that organizations’ inherent emphasis on goal achievement and 
the availability of legitimate means are at the core of their argument.  Such theories have, 
on occasion, been substantiated by empirical research.  For example, organizations that 
experience difficulty competing for scarce resources are often more likely to offend 
(Simpson, 1986; Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975).  Also, organizations with records of poor 
performance relative to others in the same markets exhibit higher rates of offending 
(Clinard & Yeager, 1980). 
Studies have shown that organizations’ internal ethos and consequent actions are 
influenced by a variety of external forces.  That is, organizations are not entirely closed 
systems.  Van de Bunt (2010) found that a culture of silence and concealment created 
criminogenic conditions in the credit and construction industries.  These macro-level forces 
shaped entire criminal networks and markets relatively independent of individual 
organizations.  Nguyen and Pontell (2010) discovered similar macro-level stimuli underlying 
the mortgage frauds in the subprime lending industry.  Inadequate regulation, the 
indiscriminate use of alternative loan products, and a general lack of accountability shaped 
the entire mortgage industry.  Stated simply, individual organizations do not exist in a 
vacuum and do not operate autonomously from general market conditions or other 
organizations in their industries. 
  Although individual level theories of organizational crime are somewhat less 
common, there remains a general belief among some scholars that rational choice models 
can explain decision-making processes in organizational crime.  Perhaps part of the reason 
such models continue to exert influence is that they seem ideal for application to 
organizational actors.  Popular concepts portray these individuals as not committed to 
“criminal lifestyles” and, relative to other segments of the population, exceedingly risk-
averse (Coleman, 1987).  According to Schlegel (1990:16), managers are “unwilling to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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engage in activity that poses even minimal threats to the future of the corporation or their 
own position in it.”  Not only do typologies of organizational actors seem to fit well within a 
rational choice model, but so do their actions.  As Braithwaite and Geis (1982:302) stated, 
organizational crimes are “almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or 
emotional, but calculated risks taken by rational actors.” 
  Although structural and individual level theories of organizational crime persist, the 
pathologies of individuals, business cycles, and abstract market forces alone fail to provide a 
complete account of organizational crime (Hochstetler & Copes, 2001).  Despite the 
performance of industries and organizations themselves, some firms maintain exemplary 
records of compliance with ethical and legal norms while others habitually violate (Clinard & 
Yeager, 1980; Shover & Bryant, 1993; Sutherland, 1949).  While market forces create 
conditions that make crime attractive and changes in opportunities structures may create 
pressure, these factors alone fail to explain of why some organizations violate the law while 
others do not.  Individual level theories also fall short because, as research has often 
shown, organizations violate laws regardless of the composition of their personnel (Gross, 
1980; Vaughn, 1998).  Sutherland’s (1949:264) seminal study of white-collar crime 
revealed that “many of the corporations which violated the antitrust law forty years ago are 
still violating that law, although the personnel of the corporation has changed completely.  
That is, variations in persons occur without variations in behavior.” 
  Organizational culture theory posits that organizational crime is not a function of 
structural stimuli or individual characteristics themselves, but rather how they are 
interpreted.  Stimuli from external sources are almost constantly bombarding organizations 
and the actors who comprise them and certainly shape the environments in which they 
must operate.  Despite the omnipresence of such influences, some organizations violate and 
others do not because these forces are malleable.  Organizational cultures exercise a 
refracting power over virtually everything (Deal & Kennedy, 1982).  Ott (1989:69) argued 
that organizational culture “shapes members’ cognitions and perceptions of meanings and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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realities.”  Thus, structural and individual factors cannot be assumed to have inherent 
qualities that uniformly affect behavior because, despite these forces, most organizations 
have a generally ethical or unethical culture (Clinard, 1983).  This argument is not an 
abstract philosophical notion.  It simply reflects the realization that “proximate factors 
mediate the effects of distal factors” (Laub, 1994:247). 
What is a Criminogenic Culture? 
  Despite growing interest in culture-based theories of organizational crime, 
considerable confusion still surrounds the concept of organizational culture (Shover & 
Hochstetler, 2002).  Combining the various and most prominent explanations of 
organizational culture leads to the following conceptualization: organizational culture is a set 
of collective attitudes, techniques, rationalizations, and definitions (Bartnett, 1986; 
Braithwaite, 1989a; Hills, 1987).  Many of these terms, however, are ambiguous.  This 
ambiguity has made it difficult for researchers to operationalize key terms and incorporate 
them into research designs (Hochstetler & Copes, 2001).  What is imperative at this point is 
to provide a concrete schema that details the constituent components of a criminogenic 
organizational culture. 
  Organizations with criminogenic cultures are said to harbor attitudes, definitions, and 
values favorable to violations of the law (Ott, 1989).  However, research has shown that 
virtually all individuals within any formal organization are averse to being seen as criminals 
(Benson, 1984).  Identity conflict is often what is so perplexing about white collar crime.  
Consider Hills’ (Hills, 1987:190) question, “How is it possible that men who are basically 
moral and decent in their own families – perhaps even generous in civic and charitable 
contributions – are able to engage in corporate acts that have extraordinary inhumane 
consequences?”   
Whether this image of the corporate actor represents stereotypes or reality is 
debatable.  However, it represents an important component in the relationship between 
culture and organizational crime. Deviant self-concepts are an integral force in many other Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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types of criminogenic cultures (Anderson, 1990; Anderson, 1999; Braithwaite, 1989b) but 
are aversive to those within criminogenic organizational cultures.  Perhaps the best 
illustration of this point is Braithwaite’s (Braithwaite, 1989a) contention that shaming works 
in the opposite direction in formal organizations.  That is, he argued that shaming may 
deter organizational criminals whereas it often fuels “traditional” offenders.   
  The notion of criminogenic organizational cultures as comprised of definitions, 
attitudes, and values favorable to law violations is not necessarily untrue or unimportant.  
Instead, it is simply too vague to provide a clear point of demarcation from conforming 
cultures.  Any attempt to identify a “tipping point,” or point of distinction between 
criminogenic and conforming cultures, must be guided by the fact that criminogenic cultures 
must simultaneously promote unlawful behavior and protect positive appearances and self-
concepts.  From here we can begin to understand how criminogenic culture manifests.  If 
the function of criminogenic organizational cultures is to (a) promote offending and (b) 
maintain positive self-concepts and appearances, it follows logically that such cultures will 
manifest in the form of techniques of neutralization.  Case studies and qualitative research 
have often found neutralizing linguistic devices underlying organizational crimes. 
  Denial of responsibility is the belief that individual offenders are not blameworthy 
because responsibility for their criminal behavior lies elsewhere.  This technique lends well 
to the context of organizational offending.  Responsibility for any type of behavior can easily 
be diffused because decisions are typically made incrementally by different individuals 
(Hochstetler & Copes, 2001).  Also, the hierarchical structure of organizations allows 
individual offenders to place blame on their superiors.  For example, the following quote 
comes from a study of false reporting at B.F. Goodrich: “I learned a long time ago not to 
worry about things over which I have no control.  I have no control over this…Why should 
my conscience bother me?” (Vadivier, 1996:118).   
  Denial of injury associates the wrongfulness of any action with the harm it causes.  
Organizational offenders who are able to convince themselves that their behavior did not Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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harm anyone are, therefore, able to maintain that they did nothing wrong.  Denying that 
their actions are injurious is relatively easy for organizational offenders because they 
seldom witness the harm they cause firsthand.  For example, in a price-fixing case involving 
the heavy electrical industry, a witness and employee of one of the corporations being 
prosecuted claimed that his peers’ behavior was “illegal? Yes, but not criminal…I assumed 
that a criminal action meant damaging someone, we did not do that” (Geis, 1967:122). 
  Denial of victim is a neutralization device that manifests as offenders blame their 
victims for their own suffering.  Hills (1987) found, for example, that manufacturers of the 
harmful intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) stated that infections caused by their 
product were not the result of design flaws; instead, users were causing the infections by 
improperly inserting the device or by being excessively promiscuous.  Also, because of the 
complex nature of most organizational crimes, identifying a human victim is difficult even 
for law enforcement (Braithwaite & Geis, 1982).  Organizational offenders, therefore, are 
often able to justify their actions on the grounds that there is no “real” victim.   
  Condemnation of the condemners occurs when offenders express denial of the 
legitimacy of the law and those who enforce it.  Organizational offenders often believe that 
the authorities’ invite, even demand, the behavior for which they are persecuted 
(Hochstetler & Copes, 2001).  A study of Medicaid fraud found that doctors who file false 
claims believed they were forced to do so because the regulatory environment changed 
frequently, was ambiguous, and was controlled by people who knew nothing about the 
realities of their work (Jeslow, Pontell, & Geis, 1993). 
  Appeal to higher loyalties is the contention that violating the law is a necessary 
component of the pursuit of broader, more important goals.  Accordingly, offenders believe 
that their behavior is justified or even honorable.  In the context of organizational crime, 
these “higher loyalties” are often the organization itself and/or its shareholders.  For 
example, Sonnenfeld and Lawrence (1978) discovered that persons convicted of price-fixing 
between two folding-box companies justified their offense by stating, “I’ve always though of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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myself as an honorable citizen.  We didn’t do these things for our own behalf…[but] for the 
betterment of the company.”  Friedman (1962) argued that no where in the cultural milieu 
of organizational conduct in America does there exist a notion of social responsibility. 
  The relationship between guilt-neutralizing linguistic devices and the commission of 
white collar crimes is not new.  Cressey (2001) discovered what was later termed 
“techniques of neutralization” (Sykes & Matza, 1957) in his study of embezzlement over 50 
years ago.  To date, however, scholars have undervalued the role these techniques play.  
They are not merely “rationalizations that…make criminal conduct possible” (Hochstetler & 
Copes, 2001:214).  They also represent the substance of an organization’s ethos.  That is, 
neutralizations not only provide a mechanism with which potential offenders are able to 
minimize “damage to his (or her) self-image” (Sykes & Matza, 1957:667).  These linguistic 
devices also provide insight into the locus of authority, the definitions of situations and 
stimuli, and the set of priorities that any given organizational culture has established.   
  One additional shortcoming of extant research and theory is that organizational 
cultures are often treated as dichotomous.  That is, organizational cultures are either 
conformist or criminogenic.  A dichotomous model is illusory, however, because the 
criminogenesis of organizational culture is best represented as a continuum.  Some 
organizations that violate the law do so habitually; others do so sparingly.  It is essential 
both to theory and policy to construct a theoretical model that can be used to identify the 
degree to which an organizational culture is criminogenic.  This paper posits that the 
presence of neutralizing linguistic devices can act as an indicator of criminogenic culture.  
Two additional principles – multiplicy and generalizability – will signify the degree to which 
an organizational culture is criminogenic.   
First, multiplicity refers to the number of different devices active within any given 
organization’s culture.  Organizations that utilize more neutralizing techniques than their 
counterparts are able to justify a greater frequency of violations.  As individuals acting on 
behalf of their organization violate more and different types of laws, more and different Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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types of neutralizing techniques are needed to justify their behavior.  Thus, the degree to 
which an organizational culture is criminogenic can be measured by the frequency of 
neutralization devices therein.    
Second, generalizability refers to any given device’s ability to apply to a variety of 
offenses.  Certain types of techniques are more generalizable than others and, therefore, 
will contribute to a greater frequency of violations.  Offenders who justify their actions 
because they did not cause harm may be unable to justify (or generalize their neutralization 
technique to) other types of violations which impact different persons in different ways.  In 
contrast, offenders who justify their actions because their definitive loyalty lies in satiating 
the needs of the organization can extend this rationale more easily to different types of 
violations.  Any action they may take is justifiable regardless of the number of victims, how 
they are victimized, and who is ultimately responsible to the extent that their actions benefit 
the organization.  Braithwaite (1993), for example, found that certain rationalizations were 
used to justify multiple different types of offenses in the nursing home industry; others 
facilitated a specific offense.   
It has been argued thus far that techniques of neutralization are the principal 
components of criminogenic organizational cultures.  The multiplicity and generalizability of 
the specific devices active within any given organization marks the degree to which its 
culture is criminogenic.  It is imperative, however, to also identify the origins and 
mechanisms through which these linguistic devices spread throughout complex 
organizations.  Detailing these methods of dissemination not only fills a gap in the scholarly 
literature, but can also be used by regulators in the prevention of organizational crime.  
The Transmission of Culture 
  There is a general consensus that the substance of organizational culture is 
determined by those at the top of the hierarchy (Coleman & Ramos 1998).  As Jenkins and 
Braithwaite (2001:222-3) stated: Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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There are not many themes in the empirical literature on corporate crime that are 
repeatedly reported.  A recurrent one, however, is that pressure for the worst type of 
corporate crimes comes from the top.  Organizations, like fish, rot from the head 
down. 
 
Research has shown that it is “top management, and in particular the chief executive officer 
(CEO), who sets the ethical tone” (Clinard, 1983:132).  Although middle-managers typically 
carry out organizational offenses, these crimes result from the dictates of their 
organizational culture as determined by their superiors (Jenkins & Braithwaite, 2001).  
Despite a general agreement that cultural values are learned by subordinates from their 
superiors, theory and research has yet to explain this learning process.  How do 
criminogenic values spread from the top down in an organizational setting?  The principles 
of differential association-reinforcement and operant conditioning found in social learning 
theory can fill this gap.   
Social Learning Theory 
  Social learning theory’s concepts of differential association-reinforcement and 
operant conditioning posit that behavior is conditioned through intricate processes of 
rewards and punishment.  Referred to as reinforcers, the consequent stimuli that shape 
behavior include, but are not limited to, food, money, social attention, approval, affection, 
and status.   Research has shown that there are two aspects of reinforcement that 
determine the outcome of the conditioning process.  These are the (a) style of 
reinforcement and (b) the schedule of reinforcement (Akers, 1985). 
The style of reinforcement involves both the type of reinforcement as well as the 
action taken.  The former refers to whether the stimuli are positive or negative, whereas the 
later indicates whether stimuli were added or removed.  In combination, these two result in 
four styles of reinforcement:  
1)  Positive reinforcement – the addition of positive stimuli. 
2)  Negative reinforcement – the removal of negative stimuli. 
3)  Positive punishment – the addition of negative stimuli. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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4)  Negative punishment – the removal of positive stimuli. 
Behavior that produces the first two styles of reinforcement is likely to continue in the 
future and potentially increase in frequency.  In contrast, the last two styles cause a 
cessation of the preceding behavior.   
  The schedule of reinforcement refers specially to how the style is introduced or 
removed.  Social learning theory identifies four schedules of reinforcement: 
1)  Fixed-interval – behaviors are reinforced only after a set amount of time has 
passed. 
2)  Variable-interval – behaviors are reinforced only after varying amounts of time 
have passed. 
3)  Fixed-ratio – the style of reinforcement occurs after a set amount of behaviors. 
4)  Variable-ratio – the style of reinforcement occurs after varying amounts of 
behaviors. 
From these schedules we see that time and frequency are of the utmost importance in 
shaping behavior.  In a typical scenario, the first two schedules present reinforcement after 
each response.  The difference between these two is that the amount of time that passes 
between the manifestation of the behavior and the presentation of the reinforcement is 
uniform in the first and intermittent in the second.  The last two schedules reinforce 
behavior without delay, but do not reinforce each response.  In a variable-interval schedule, 
reinforcement is presented after a uniform number of responses (e.g., after every tenth 
manifestation), whereas fixed-ratio scheduling presents reinforcement after an intermittent 
number of responses.   
  Each schedule has the ability to produce results on a short term basis.  Over longer 
periods of time, however, research has found that the effects produced by some schedules 
tend to subside.  Scholars refer to this phenomenon as extinction (Burgess & Akers, 1966; 
Bandura, 1969).  The first two schedules – fixed-ratio and variable-ratio – are the most 
robust and are, therefore, able to produce steady results over longer periods of time.  The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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interval schedules, both fixed and variable, are the most susceptible to extinction.  Ratio 
schedules are more powerful, according to operant conditioning scholars, because there is 
no temporal delay between the response and stimulus.  Thus, how quickly behavior is 
reinforced is more powerful than how often it is reinforced (Bandura, 1977).  The following 
section applies the principles of social learning theory to organizational crime and the 
transmission of criminogenic culture.   
Social Learning Theory in an Organizational Context 
The principles of social learning theory are particularly well-suited to explaining how 
criminogenic values are learned in a top-down process in an organizational setting.  Within 
any given formal organization, those who occupy positions atop the hierarchy exercise a 
high degree of control over rewards and punishments.  Intentionally or not, top-level 
managers’ application of these stimuli shapes the attitudes and behavior of their 
subordinates.  Thus, the relative autonomy they enjoy in choosing what types of behavior to 
reward and punish, and how to go about doing so, affords them almost unrestricted control 
in the establishment of their organizational cultures. 
Persons atop the hierarchy are able to discriminately apply and remove very 
powerful stimuli.  Organizational leaders have at their disposal money, social attention, 
approval, responsibility, and status.  Managers will inevitably distribute these resources 
disproportionately to subordinates who appear to share (or are willing to adopt) their 
attitudes, values, and definitions of certain circumstances and behavior.  Members of 
organizations who perform the tasks they are given in a manner keeping with the 
expectations of their boss are likely to be praised and given more responsibilities in the 
future.  Continuing to act in accordance with these expectations, and to do so with 
enthusiasm, may lead to promotions and raises that can represent substantial amounts of 
money and status.  Emulating the values of those atop the hierarchy also leads to more 
informal rewards such as social inclusion, approval, and trust.  Conversely, those who fail to 
espouse the attitudes and priorities of their superiors are likely to incur punishment.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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Members whose values conflict with those their supervisor’s, and whose actions do not 
conform to the expectations of their boss, will be met with shame, disapproval, and 
marginalization if not outright dismissal.   
This distribution of rewards and punishments not only affects recipients, but, through 
a process of vicarious reinforcement, shapes the attitudes and behavior the entire 
organization’s workforce.  Vicarious reinforcement, or “imitation,” explains how effective 
reinforcement can influence those who witness its administration. A study by Lott and Lott 
(1960) found that when child A was reinforced in the presence of child B, child A would later 
select child B as a companion.  The child’s selection of child B as a companion was not 
reinforced, however.  The investigators concluded that neutral people will assume the 
conditions of stimuli the respondent learns to associate with them.  In a similar study, 
Bandura, Ross, & Ross (1963) paired an adult with positive reinforcers.  Overtime, these 
adults became positive reinforcers themselves and the children whose behavior was being 
studied began to imitate these adults behavior.  Through these processes of vicarious 
reinforcement, people can assume reinforcement qualities and others will mimic their 
behavior.  Thus, organizational actors will imitate the behavior of coworkers who are 
rewarded.  This phenomenon can, over time, have far reaching effects within any given 
organization.  Moreover, it is plausible that coworkers will themselves become reinforcers.  
Members who resist the tide of their organization’s culture will likely be met with 
disapproval from their colleagues based on a perception that they are obstructing 
organizational goals and are not “team players.” 
Social learning theory contains several important implications for the prevention of 
organizational crime.  Preventing organizational crime requires interrupting or manipulating 
the mechanisms through which criminogenic cultural values are transmitted.  The 
transmission mechanisms identified here involve three important aspects of reinforcement 
scheduling: a) amount – the greater the amount of reinforcement, the higher the response 
rate; b) frequency – the shorter the time period between reinforcements, the higher the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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response rate; and c) probability – the lower the ratio of responses per reinforcement, the 
higher the response rate (Burgess & Akers, 1966).  These aspects provide insight into why 
the law has historically been ineffective at controlling organizational crime.  Learning theory 
posits that “a criminal act occurs in an environment in which in the past the actor has been 
reinforced for behaving in this manner, and the aversive consequences attached to the 
behavior have been of such a nature that they do not control or prevent the response” 
(Jeffery, 1965:295).  Organizations simply can and do exercise much more effective 
schedules of reinforcement than the criminal justice system is able to maintain.   
Organizations can ensure that behavior is reinforced often (probability), immediately 
(frequency), and overwhelmingly (amount).  In contrast, the criminal justice system seldom 
even detects violations and, when it does, is met by extreme difficulty in effectively 
prosecuting offenders (Braithwaite & Geis, 1982).  Organizational actors can also exercise 
control over the reinforcements they receive from the law.  When organizations and their 
actors are charged with crimes, they often use company resources to avoid punishment 
(Barak, Leighton, & Flavin, 2007).  Coleman’s (1985) study of the enforcement of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in the petroleum industry revealed four major strategies that 
organizations utilized to evade the law.  The first strategy, endurance and delay, involves 
mobilizing legal resources to prolong litigation and prevent the discovery of damaging 
evidence by filing as many motions as possible.  Second, many organizations use their 
financial resources and political connections to persuade regulators, judges, and prosecutors 
away from full enforcement.  Third, organizational actors often use secrecy and deception to 
mask who was responsible and in control.  The last strategy involves threats of economic 
consequences to local communities and/or the economy if laws are fully enforced.  These 
and other strategies prevent the law from enacting effective schedules of reinforcement. 
Organizational actors are somewhat insulated from the effects of external stimuli by 
the culture of their organization.  As previously explained, organizational cultures exercise a 
refracting power over external stimuli.  Through the conditioning process, those at the helm Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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of reinforcement can mold their subordinates’ perceptions of the external world.  For 
instance, the neutralization techniques “condemnation of condemners” and “appeal to 
higher loyalties” essentially marks a rejection of external codes, including the law, in favor 
of those established by their organizational culture.  To effectively prevent organizational 
crime requires disrupting criminogenic cultures from within organizations.  Research has 
shown that organizations that have formally institutionalized compliance divisions – 
departments tasked with ensuring their organization conforms to the law – are far less likely 
than others to engage in delinquency.  These departments achieve even greater success 
when they are “given real power within the organization and a central location in its 
information flow” (Coleman, 1992:69).  Compliance divisions are tasked with ensuring that 
their organization observes regulatory laws and are often afforded the authority to punish 
violations and/or reward compliance.  Internal compliance divisions have been effective at 
curtailing organizational crime in the nursing home industry, the pharmaceutical industry, 
and corporations (Braithwaite, 1984; Braithwaite, 1989a; Braithwaite, 1993).  According to 
the perspective taken in this essay, these departments are successful because they prevent 
the creation of (or eradicate existing) criminogenic cultures by interrupting their flow of 
communication, impeding the utility of neutralizing techniques, and, most importantly, 
establishing and maintaining effective schedules of reinforcement. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Research suggests that variations in organizational culture can explain patterns of 
organizational crime.  However, exactly what the criminogenic characteristics of these 
cultures are and how they spread throughout complex organizations has yet to be identified.  
Preliminary studies have described criminogenic organizational cultures as harboring 
attitudes, definitions, and values that promote unlawful conduct.  In addition to promoting 
illegal acts, such cultures must also function in a way that allows perpetrators to maintain 
positive self-concepts.  If criminogenic organizational cultures must simultaneously (a) 
encourage offending and (b) promote positive images of offenders, it follows logically that Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology      Culture-Based Theories and Organizational Crime  
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techniques of neutralization are their most discernable characteristic.  This paper has 
argued that the multiplicity and generalizability of these neutralizations can be used to 
determine the degree to which organizational cultures are criminogenic. 
Research has further shown that criminogenic values trickle down the organizational 
hierarchy.  Thus, organizational actors learn techniques of neutralization from those who 
occupy positions atop the hierarchy.  The process through which these techniques are 
learned is less clear.  It has been argued here that social learning theory can explain this 
process.  Top-level managers have the authority to administer very powerful stimuli 
however and to whomever they choose.  Their discriminate application of these stimuli will 
inevitably mold the ethos of their subordinates and, over time, their entire organization.  
The most promising strategy for preventing organizational crime is the establishment of 
internal compliance divisions.  These divisions, if given real authority to maintain schedules 
of reinforcement, can disrupt the transmission of criminogenic cultures within complex 
organizations. 
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